What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules by Gillers, Stephen
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Volume 46, Number 2, 1985
What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics:
A Critical View of the Model Rules
STEPHEN GILLERS*
The legal profession, or the part of it called organized, recently endured a six
year debate over rules it would adopt to describe the professionally responsible
conduct of its members.' After various drafts, some generally circulated, 2 others not,
and with occasional key reversals between them,3 the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association in August 1983 approved a new model ethics code, which
it named the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules).4 Acronymically and in a
few other ways it reverses its predecessor, the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), which survived a scant thirteen and a half years.5 By contrast,
the Code's predecessor, the Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, reigned
(with amendments) for well more than half a century. 6 There is optimism that the
Rules, grandchild of the line, will outlast its ancestors. What, in any event, would we
name the fourth generation?
After the House of Delegates concluded its work, the debate moved to state and
local forums. 7 As of the end of 1984, eighteen months after ABA approval, only two
states had substituted the Rules for the Code, in either their model or a derivative
form.' This contrasts with twenty-four state adoptions of the Code by early 1971
when it was about equally young.9 Of course, the Code won easy passage in an age
that held legal ethics, then renamed professional responsibility, to be a triple yawn
topic. In law schools, it was sometimes said, the task of teaching it usually fell to the
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1. "The Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards was appointed in the summer of 1977 by then ABA
President William B. Spann, Jr .... MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Chairman's Introduction, (Proposed
Final Draft, May 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Draft.) The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates on August 2, 1983. Taylor, Bar Group Adopts Model Ethics Code, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1983, at A 1, col. 1.
2. The drafts that received wide circulation and which will be considered here are the MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Draft; the 1981 Draft, supra note 1; and
the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft, June 30, 1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Draft].
3, See, e.g., infra notes 145, 152-54, 170, 183, 221. 222, 253-58, 280, 282 & 296 and accompanying text.
4. Taylor, supra note I.
5. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY (1970); see also Frankel, Book Review, 43 U. CH. L. REV.
874, 875 n.10 (1976).
6. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908); see also Frankel, supra note 5, at 875 n.4.
7. The ABA proposes ethical rules and the states adopt them through whatever adoptive mechanisms they have. As
a result, ethical rules for lawyers are not uniform throughout the nation. See Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate
Practice of Law, 50 WASI. L. RE v. 699, 699 (1975); Note, Regulating Multistate Law Firms, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1211,
1211-12 (1980). Courts have ruled that an ethics code does not have the binding force of a statute. Rosen v. N.L.R.B.,
735 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Estate of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 351 N.E.2d 647, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1976).
8. Only New Jersey and Arizona have so far substituted the Rules for the Code. [Current Reports) 1 LAw. MAN. ON
PROF. CONDUCT (BNA) 334 (New Jersey adopted the Rules July 25, 1984); id. at 445 (Arizona adopted the Rules Oct. 3,
1984).
9. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 96 ANNUAL REPORT 243 (1971).
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dean because no one else would. Compared with the professional and even public
contentiousness attending the adoption of the Rules, ° the Code emerged in amiable
obscurity.
One may mull, and some have, 1 over the ABA's motives for bearing the costs
and burdens of producing an ethics code sufficiently general to win approval from its
membership yet sufficiently demanding to win credibility beyond it. After all, neither
the world nor the profession would come to naught if there were no document telling
lawyers how to behave. Constraints imposed by civil and criminal law, the market,
and the desire for good standing in one's community would remain. And let us not
forget the resourcefulness of the common law. The Code, for example, said little
useful about successive coriflicts of interest, yet courts readily proceeded to define
them and to fashion appropriate disqualification remedies. 12
Absent a new Watergate or similar national scandal in which members of the bar
reappear as lead villains, the subject of legal ethics has probably passed the peak of its
popularity. For several reasons, however, it is not likely to recede to its former
anonymity. First, there is now a sufficiently large constituency of "experts" in and
out of the academy who make a living from the subject and who will demand time on
professional and public agenda.' 3 Second, lawyers have learned that ethical issues
have strategic uses, 14 making their continued employment in litigation likely and
currency in them of value. Third, as the number of American lawyers rises per
capita, 15 the number of ethical violations should at least keep pace-or, with greater
competition for clients, accelerate-providing more work for disciplinary committees
and those who staff and appear before them. Fourth, the debate over the Rules spilled
over into the national press.16 Journalists better learned to cover the profession. A
few do only that. They are likely to continue watching. Fifth, the ABA now requires
as a condition of law school accreditation that a student's education include instruc-
tion in professional ethics. 17 Students, who once thought it enough to know not to
steal, lie, or neglect client matters, are encountering nastier questions-if not their
10. The Model Rules became the focus of front page newspaper stories, see, e.g., Taylor, Lawyers Vote Against
Disclosure of Fraudulent Activities by Clients, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1983, at Al, col. 2, and editorials, see, e.g., Whose
Lawyer?, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 16, col. 1; see also Taylor, Ethics and the Law: A Case History, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 9, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 31. A number of law journals committed substantial space to articles discussing the
content of drafts of the Model Rules. See, e.g., Symposium, Ethical Codes and the Legal Profession, 59 Tax. L. REV.
No. 4 (1981).
11. See, e.g., Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 Tax. L. REv. 639 (1981); Rhode, Why the
ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, id. at 689.
12. See, e.g., Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1983); Glueck v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746
(2d Cir. 1981).
13. In the last dozen years, substantially more law school faculty have begun to teach courses in the legal profession.
In the academic year 1972, the Directory of Law Teachers, published by the Association of American Law Schools,
contained barely more than four columns of names of teachers of professional responsibility. See A.A.L.S. DiRECTORY OF
LAw TEACHERs 754-56 (1972). By contrast, the 1983-84 Directory contains about twice as many names. A.A.L.S.
DiREcrORY OF LAW TEACHERS 853-57 (1983). Nonacademic interest in legal professional standards is revealed by the
dramatic increase in the last dozen years in the number of malpractice actions. See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE 18-19 (2d ed. 1981).
14. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated on other grounds, 449
U.S. 1106 (1981); Gillers, Great Expectations: Conceptions of Lawyers at the Angle of Entry, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 662,
674-76 (1983).
15. Id. at 679 n.67.
16. See supra note 10.
17. APPROVAL OF LAW SCHooLs: AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION STANDARDS AND RuLEs OF PROCEDURE, STAN-
DARD 302(a)(iv) (1983).
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answers-like what to do when a client appears with murder weapon in hand, 18 or
upon discovering that a corporate employer is set to market a dangerously defective
consumer good. 19 The fact that the Multistate Bar Examination has separately graded
ethical questions20 should also encourage increased attention to legal ethics.
Still, even an ardent student of the behavior of lawyers must concede that these
developments will not, absent scandal, place his or her subject on the front burners of
professional or public discourse. Will it so much as find a warm place on the stove?
Legal ethics is comparatively inconsequential to students and lawyers because (ex-
cept for legal history and jurisprudence) it is perhaps the law school subject least
useful to earning a living, and to earn a living is mostly why students study law.
So we find ourselves at the end of a period that has probably seen more intense
and candid discussion of what it means to be an American lawyer, more attention
paid to that role than ever before, and more than is likely to recur for a good while.
For so homely a subject, it is an embarrassment of attention, passing though it may
be. Before it passes further, we might profitably essay a telescopic interpretation of
the text of the Rules in order to decipher (with apologies to Raymond Carver)2 what
it was we talked about when we talked about ethics. The moment is opportune.
Because the matters addressed in and omitted from the Rules were debated by so
many, so intensely, for so long,22 the final document embodies a condensed, ellipti-
cal self-portrait of the American bar's influential constituencies. What does it show?
Close up, I will argue, little that is flattering. The bar has drafted a code that
proves the wisdom of its own precept against client-lawyer conflicts. 23 The lawyers
who approved24 the Rules looked after their own. They have given us an astonishing-
ly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers over clients, other
persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line, paragraph, and provi-
sion that permits significant choice. It is internally inconsistent to the bar's benefit.2 5
It continues the practice of using the language of ethics to mask controls on the
availability of legal services that in turn artificially inflate the cost of the services. 26
True, the Rules read better than the Code and fill some critical gaps. 27 Here and
there, they require or forbid conduct for which they deserve commendation.28 But the
18. See, e.g., A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 374-85 (1984); Note, Ethics, Law, and
Loyalty: The Attorney's Duty to Turn Over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REV. 977 (1980).
19. See, e.g., T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 35 (3d ed. 1984).
20. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, MULTISTATE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMINATION
(1984).
21. R. CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABoTrr LOVE (1981).
22. The 1982 Draft lists more than 100 organizations and individuals who responded to the 1981 Draft. 1982 Draft,
supra note 2. app. D.
23. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1983); see infra text accompanying notes 298-99.
24. This article discusses the Rules as adopted by the ABA House of Delegates. Its text in many ways differs from
the various drafts. See supra note 3.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 277-85.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 249-85.
27. For example, Rules 5.1 and 5.2 address the responsibilities of supervisory and subordinate lawyers; Rule 3.8(e)
describes the responsiblities of prosecutors for the extrajudicial statements of law enforcement officers; and Rule 2.2
addresses the circumstances under which a lawyer may serve as an intermediary. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rules 2.2, 3.8(e), 5.1 & 5.2 (1983).
28. Law firm partners, for example, are required to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct." Id. Rule
5.1(a) (1983).
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big issues are almost consistently resolved in favor of lawyers. As finally adopted,
the Rules seem guided by the view that what's good for lawyers is good -for the
public. Look at any part and that conclusion may not suggest itself; look at the whole
and it is inescapable.
SIX WAYS TO READ THE MODEL RULES
I here summarize and will then discuss six ways to read a legal ethics code,
using the Rules as an example.
First, ascertain the extent to which the document traces the commands of civil or
criminal law. The more it does so, I shall argue, the less it can be considered a code
of ethics. Second, distinguish among the four constituencies whose interests the code
might be expected to recognize. These are clients, individual lawyers, the profession
as a whole, and others. By others I mean identifiable others, such as adversaries of
clients, as well as the legal system or the administration of justice generally. Third,
identify the interests of these constituencies. For example, clients have an interest in
loyalty,29 lawyers in professional independence, 3 ° and the legal system in preventing
abuse of its institutions.3 1 Fourth, determine whether a rule's concrete expression
compromises legitimate interests of another constituency. A lawyer's duty to "keep a
client reasonably informed about the status of a matter''32 entails no such compro-
mise because no person or group has a fair claim to have lawyers act otherwise. These
rules present easy cases. By contrast, a rule may favor one group's interests over the
legitimate interests of another constituency. A former client's interest that con-
fidences not be used to his disadvantage 33 may be seen to clash with the interests of a
lawyer who wants to represent an adversary of the former client but whose partner
represented the former client in a prior firm affiliation. Must the former client take the
risk that his former lawyer will leak damaging confidences to her new partner? Or
must the new partner forego the representation?
34
Fifth, in reading an ethics code we must differentiate even among those rules
that favor the interests of one constituency over those of another. Some of these
resolutions, I suggest, should be seen as thoughtful responses to hard issues, often
with scant empirical information. While these rules are not beyond criticism, neither
do they prove that lawyers place their interests ahead of those of clients. Rule
1.10(b), dealing with imputed disqualification from successive representations, is in
this category. 35 Other resolutions, however, like the treatment of withdrawal in Rule
29. See infra text accompanying notes 93-113.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 174-92.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 193-216.
32. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(a) (1983).
33. Id. Rule 1.9(b).
34. The Model Rules require the new partner to forego the representation if the prior matter is the same or
substantially related. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) (1983).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10(b) (1983). Dean Morgan's excellent interest analysis of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 702 (1977), may be too critical on this point. Dean Morgan argues that when the Code imputes knowledge within a
firm where a member of the firm represented the adversary of a current client in a former affiliation, "the Code has
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1.16,36 the absolute prohibition on lay ownership or control of law firms in Rule
5.4,37 and the failure in Rule 1.5 to require written retainer agreements, 38 are in-
defensibly lawyer-centered in their adjustment of competing interests. These rules
may be explained by the fact that they were drafted by the very group whose behavior
they aim to control. Sixth, and finally, the whole of an ethics code should be held up
to its promises, the heft of the thing measured against the advantages of self-
regulation as the code itself describes them.
I will discuss the first and final ways of reading a code separately and the middle
four together.
ETHICS AND LAW
Some provisions of an ethics code duplicate civil or criminal law, such as the
prohibition against assisting a client in "criminal or fraudulent" activity,39 or the one
against filing a frivolous claim,40 or the command not to "unlawfully obstruct an-
other party's access to evidence." 4 Requirements that a lawyer "act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client," 42  "provide competent
representation,"- 43 "keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter," 44 and "not use a client's confidences to the client's disadvantage,", 45 large-
ly restate what contract and agency law separately are likely to require.4 6 There are
other examples, often restating the law of agency or contract, tort, or criminal law.
47
They may not be exact replicas, and if at the margins their mandates are broader than
the legal duties they echo, they may be said to contain a sliver of ethical content. But
the differences are minimal. The debate over many of these provisions was not about
their inclusion but their wording, and was often over nuance.
48
defined that course as 'ethical' which best insulates a lawyer from criticism." Id. at 730. But a code that chose the
opposite position could be equally faulted as insensitive to client secrets so lawyers could keep business. A broad
imputation of knowledge rule is not beyond criticism, but an inference of improper motive does not seem justified.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 174-81.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 250-66.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 182-89.
39. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
40. Id. Rule 3.1. Cf. FED. R. Ctv. P. 11.
41. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a).
42. Id. Rule 1.3.
43. Id. Rule 1.1.
44. Id. Rule 1.4(a).
45. Id. Rule 1.8(b).
46. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal.3d 349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (competence and diligence);
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980) (competence and diligence); Stewart v. Sbarro,
142 N.J. Super. 581, 591,362 A.2d 581, 587 (App. Div. 1976) (diligence); Haller v. Wallis, 89 Wash. 2d 539, 573 P.2d
1302 (1978) (duty to communicate); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395-96 (1957) (duty to keep confidences);
Spiegel, Laityering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. Rev. 41,
67-68 (1979) (duty to communicate). Courts differ on whether the duties lie in contract, tort or both. See Pelham v.
Griesheimer, 92 II1. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982).
47. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983) (lawyer shall not knowingly "offer
evidence that the lawyer knows to be false"); id. Rule 3.5(a) (lawyer shall not "seek to influence a judge ... by means
prohibited by law"); id. Rule 4.4 ("lawyer in representing a client shall not use means that ... violate the legal rights of
... a [third] person").
48. For example, Rule 1.2 in the 1980 draft said: "A lawyer shall attend promptly to matters undertaken for a client
and give them adequate attention until completed or until the lawyer has properly withdrawn from representing the
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One could count up the words or duties in the Rules in an effort to determine
what proportion of either largely restates law, but an exact figure is not necessary. A
substantial number of the Rules require that lawyers do what the law already requires
lawyers do to avoid civil or criminal liability. 49 The fact that an ethical duty is also a
legal one does not make it redundant. Placing an obligation in both categories may
enhance compliance by providing a second, perhaps more influential sanction. But
while it may not for compliance purposes be redundant to define some illegal or
actionable conduct as unethical, the greater the portion of an ethical code that merely
incorporates legal duties (especially ones, like those in penal laws, that already carry
persuasive force), the less may the resulting document seek credibility as a pro-
fession's code of ethics. In unveiling such a code a profession presumably says more
than that its members must refrain from certain conduct that will get them sued or
jailed. It is this extralegal realm that defines ethics. As we will see below, when we
take its measure alone the Rules shrink considerably.
CONSTITUENCIES AND INTERESTS
The next distinctions I wish to make are among the constituencies whose in-
terests a legal ethics code will likely recognize and the nature of those interests. As
for the constituencies, the very idea of a lawyer's ethics code presupposes the exist-
ence of the professional, the client or prospective client, and the institutions of a legal
system. There will often be other constituencies too, such as those with whom a client
deals and those the client opposes. There is finally, but not necessarily, the profession
itself, which may have its own goals to pursue. Let me summarize the interests of
each constituency as these appear in the Rules and then expand on them.
Clients are viewed as having four overlapping interests. These are in controlling
information that the lawyer learns as a result of the representation,5 0 in the lawyer's
loyalty, 51 in the lawyer's service,52 and in what has come to be called autonomy, 53
which may be defined as the power to make decisions about events that have conse-
quence for one's life.54 Autonomy is not the exact converse of another newly popular
ethical topic, paternalism,55 which is sometimes present when one person impedes
the autonomy of another by consciously making a decision for him without his
client." 1980 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 1.2. As adopted, Rule 1.3 reads: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.3 (1983). In the 1980 draft,
Rule 3. l(a)(3) prohibited lawyers from offering evidence which the lawyer "is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt is
false." 1980 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 3.1. As adopted, Rule 3.3(a)(4) forbids a lawyer to "offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983).
49. See infra notes 137, 147-48, 156, 172, 195-200, 217-18, 230-31, 236 & 240 and accompanying text.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 78-85.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 93-113.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 114-36. Client autonomy issues may arise in two contexts, and it is important
to distinguish between them. See infra text accompanying notes 114-16.
54. See Martyn, Informed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 307, 311-13 (1980); see also
Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (Blackmun, J. concurring); id. at 3316 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
55. See Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 WIs. L. Rav. 454, 458.
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informed consent. It is possible to suffer a loss of autonomy without becoming the
subject of paternalism. 6
In the Rules, the interests of the lawyer are, first, in professional independence:
to decline to render service to a client or prospective client, although the lawyer may
legally and ethically do so, 57 and to be free to render legal services without external
or client intrusion on the exercise of professional discretion. 58 Second, the Rules
respect the lawyer's interest in his or her economic well-being.
5 9
The interests of others are to limit what a lawyer may do to the advantage of a
client or herself but to the detriment of other persons (including prospective clients) 60
or the justice system, and to impose on lawyers duties to others that may run counter
to their clients' or their own interests.
6 1
Finally come the interests of the enterprise, the profession itself, as dis-
tinguished from the interests of individual lawyers. The enterprise is concerned with
structures for marketing legal services. 62 Rules that constrain the supply side benefit
some (by definition dominant) factions within the profession while disadvantaging
others. A code of ethics reconciles these intra-enterprise frictions. Past examples of
these rules include prohibitions on legal advertising 63 and various forms of group
practice, 64 and the enforcement of minimum fee schedules. 65 Each was defended as
beneficial to clients66 but each predictably inflated the cost of legal services. 67 Each
also disadvantaged those lawyers whose professional goals would have benefited
from advertising, group practice or lower fees. 68 The Rules forbid lay ownership or
control of for-profit law firms, 6 9 as did the Code70  and Canons,7 1 and justifies the
56. An example of this kind of lost autonomy is when a person is denied the opportunity to make a decision, possibly
because another fails to inform her that a decision has to be made, but no one makes the decision for her.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 174-81 & 192.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 118-19, 147-55.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 175-76, 182-87, 277-85.
60. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rules 7.1, 7.2 & 7.3 (1983) (advertising and solicitation).
61. See infra text accompanying notes 193-248.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 249-85.
63. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
64. United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Note, Group Legal Services and the
Organized Bar, 10 COLUEI. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs., 228, 234-46 (1974).
65. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
66. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-79 (1977) (prohibitions on advertising); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 781 (1975) (minimum fee schedules); United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1967) (collective efforts to secure low cost representation).
67. In Goldfarb, petitioners queried 36 attorneys about charges for a house closing. Nineteen attorneys responded.
Each attorney wanted one percent of the purchase price, the amount prescribed by the minimum fee schedule. Several
attorneys said they knew of no lawyer who would accept the matter for less than one percent. Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 776 (1975). Minimum fee schedules were held anticompetitive under the antitrust laws. Id. at 793.
Studies have shown that legal advertising reduces price without reducing quality. See, e.g., Muris & McChesney,
Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case for Legal Clinics, 1979 Am. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J.
179. In United Tmnsp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 584-85 (1971), the Union plan succeeded in reducing
counsel fees in damage actions from 40 or 50% of the recovery to 25%. See also Note, supra note 64, at 230.
68. Legal advertising, for example, has led to national legal clinics with substantial practices. In re Professional
Ethics Advisory Comm. Opinion 475, 89 N.J. 74, 444 A.2d 1092, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (Legal Clinic
of Jacoby & Meyers has 75 offices nationwide, conducts over 500 client interviews daily, and accepts about 600 new
matters weekly). Another national firm, Hyatt Legal Services, is among the ten largest law firms in the nation measured
by number of lawyers. Lewin, The New National Law Firms, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at DI, col. 3.
69. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a), (c) & (d) (1983).
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 3-102(A), DR 3-103(A) & DR 5-107(C) (1981).
71. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 33, 34 (1963).
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exclusion as being in the interest of clients.72 This explanation requires scrutiny to see
whether the true beneficiary may again be the enterprise itself.
73
Rules that recognize the interests of one group often have a converse effect on
the interests of one or more other groups. For example, a rule that requires a lawyer to
reveal information when that is "necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent
act by a client" 74 works to protect the victim of the crime or fraud although it may
cause the client civil or criminal liability. On the other hand, if the lawyer's duty does
not encompass confidential information, 75 the interests of the client are respected to
the virtual exclusion of the victim's interests. Where a rule has inverse effects on the
interests of two groups, one might see them as part of a dyad. A legal ethics code can
operate only on lawyers.7 6 Consequently, it must speak to transactions in which an
attorney is a participant in her own right, or as the representative of a client. When
neither is true, the code has no place; regulation is left to civil and criminal law. A
code therefore can address three dyads directly (client-lawyer, lawyer-other, lawyer-
profession), and one (client-other) indirectly. 77
THE INTERESTS OF CLIENTS IN THE CLIENT-LAWYER DYAD
A. Analysis
78
I discuss the four client interests first. The first is to control information. The
Rules say a lawyer "shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client" 79 or use such information "to the disadvantage of" a client or former client.
80
The rules prohibiting the use of the client's information generally speak to situations
when the information may hurt the client's interests. There is no express 8 1 prohibition
against a lawyer using a client's information to the lawyer's advantage as long as the
information is not revealed and the client is not disadvantaged. The way the Rules
treat client information may be viewed as a special case of the client's interest in
72. "These limitations are to protect the lawyer's professional independence of judgment." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 5.4 comment (1983).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 249-85.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(b) (1983).
75. Rule 4. 1(b) does not apply if the information that would reveal the crime or fraud is within Rule 1.6, id.; see
infra text accompanying note 220.
76. "The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct
through disciplinary agencies." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope. "Obviously, the Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules cannot apply to non-lawyers .... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNSatnL-
rrY Preliminary Statement (1981).
77. Insofar as the lawyer is the intermediary between the client and the other, a code may affect the interests of
clients and others vis-a-vis each other by determining the scope of what a lawyer may and may not dofor a client to the
other. See infra text accompanying notes 193-221.
78. Because my discussion of this dyad is the longest, I have separated the analysis from the critique, which follows
at text accompanying notes 137-73. Discussions of the other dyads combine analysis and critique.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
80. Id. Rule 1.8(b) (current client); id. Rule 1.9(b) (former client).
81. Prohibition against the use of a client's information may be inferred from the general duty of loyalty, id. Rule
1.7, or from the lawyer's fiduciary status under law. Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970). DR
4-101(B)(3), by contrast, expressly forbids a lawyer to use a client's information for her or another's advantage even
without disclosure. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY DR 4-101(B)(3) (1981).
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loyalty.8 2 The disadvantageous revelation of a principal's information is disloyal.83
Successive representations are sometimes disallowed as disloyal because of the risk
that a lawyer or firm will be tempted to use a former client's information to his
disadvantage and in favor of a current client. 84 On the other hand, the fit is not exact
because Rule 1.6 forbids revelation of information even if not disadvantageous. 85
The Rules also envision loyalty8 6 and service 87 to current clients and loyalty to
former clients.88 A lawyer betrays her retainer by inaction, by failing to serve the
client's need.89 But more, a lawyer must "act with reasonable diligence and prompt-
ness in representing a client."' In describing this duty, the Comment to Rule 1.3
says:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and may take whatever lawful and ethical measures
are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. A lawyer should act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client's behalf.9'
Therefore, with the few exceptions discussed in the section on the client-other
dyad, 92 lawyers are ethically free and often required to use any means allowed by law
to achieve the client's goals. If the Rules have a dominant theme, it is that what the
law giveth, the lawyers' code of ethics shall not take away.
A lawyer must also be loyal. Loyalty is said to be "an essential element in the
lawyer's relationship to a client." 93 Defining disloyalty is simple. A lawyer is dis-
loyal when she opposes the client's interests. 94 By contrast, some representations
present only a risk of disloyalty, either because the lawyer will be tempted to abuse
the confidences of a client or former client or because the lawyer has allegiance to the
inconsistent interests of herself or others. The difficult task is to identify these risky
cases and fashion appropriate safeguards. The Rules employ a miscellany of safe-
guards depending on the nature of the risk. Some representations are banned
82. MODEL RUt.ES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9 & 1.10 (1983).
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 395-96 (1957).
84. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1983) (side switching "in a closely
related ... matter creates an unsavory appearance of conflict of interest").
85. Whereas DR 4-101(A) defined as "secret," information that would be "embarrassing" or "detrimental" to a
client, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmt'rT DR 4-101(A) (1981), Rule 1.6 prohibits the revelation of any
information "relating to representation of a client" whether or not embarrassing or detrimental. MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (1983).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESStONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.7, 1.8 (1983).
87. Id. Rules 1.1, 1.3.
88. Id. Rules 1.9, 1.10.
89. "Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination." Id. Rule 1.3 comment.
90. Id. Rule 1.3.
91. Id. Rule 1.3 comment.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 193-221.
93. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983).
94. The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the
benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the
interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONA. RESPONStBILrry EC 5-1 (1981). "As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits
undertaking representation directly adverse to that client.... Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as advocate against a
person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (1983). See also CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETtcs 15 (1963).
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altogether; 95 at other times it is deemed enough to caution the lawyer to beware of and
resist the risk.9 6 When a ban is used, the client may97 or may not98 be able to waive
the disqualification. The particular choice of safeguard appears to depend on whether
the conflict is with a former or current client and whether the threat is to confidences
or to loyalty.
Some successive representations are disallowed because of the risk that counsel
will misuse the former client's confidences. 99 Others are disallowed, irrespective of a
threat to confidences, because of the risk of disloyalty in the first matter if a lawyer
knows he may eventually be hired to undo for a second client work performed for the
first.'00 Whichever is the basis for a successive disqualification, it can always be
waived by the former client. 101 Yet other successive representations are allowed even
over the former client's objection, but with a caution to the lawyer to protect con-
fidential information.'
0 2
By contrast, concurrent conflicts are either absolutely disallowed or disallowed
subject to waiver. Rule 1.7 anticipates the possibility of a conflict between two
clients, or between a client's interests and those of a lawyer or a third person to whom
the lawyer has responsibility.' 0 3 When a conflict is concurrent, the lawyer may be
able to steer around it, act loyally, and protect confidences; the Rules give some room
to try. 104 But the Rules presume a point 0 5 when the risk of disloyalty is too great and
the representation is absolutely forbidden. Clients may not waive this type of conflict.
What does the absolute disqualification protect? Not confidentiality. Clients may
nullify that interest by waiver, 10 6 or by making the confidential information public.
Rather, it protects loyalty. The Rules reflect the view that some conflicts may be so
95. Rule 1.7 employs a test of reasonableness. A lawyer may accept a representation adverse to a client, or accept a
client despite responsibilities that may "materially limit" a representation, if he "reasonably believes" that he can do so
without "adversely affect[ing]" his duties to the client. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). By
contrast, other provisions absolutely forbid certain representations (or representations on certain terms). See, e.g., id.
Rule 1.80) (lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in client's cause of action).
96. For example, a lawyer may accept a representation adverse to a former client so long as it is not on the same or
substantially related matter, but the lawyer is cautioned not to use the former client's information to his or her dis-
advantage. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(b) & comment (1983).
97. Id. Rule 1.8(f), for example, permits a lawyer to accept compensation from a third person to represent a client
if the client consents to the arrangement, "there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship," and the client's information is protected.
98. A client may not waive the prohibition in Rule 1.8(j), forbidding a lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the
client's cause, or the one in Rule 1.8(d), directing a lawyer not to acquire media rights in the client's story prior to the
conclusion of the representation. Id. Rule 1.8(j), (d).
99. Id. Rule 1.10 comment.
100. Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 998-99 (9th Cir. 1980): "[The] professional commitment is not furthered, but
endangered, if the possibility exists that the lawyer will change sides later in a substantially related matter. . .. From this
standpoint it matters not whether confidences were in fact imparted to the lawyer by the client." Cf. MODEL RuLEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.9(a), 1. 10 comment (1983) (recognizing a continuing duty of loyalty to former clients
regardless of threat to information).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.9, 1.10(d) (1983).
102. See infra text accompanying notes 167-73.
103. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983).
104. The lawyer may proceed if she reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected. Client
consent is also required. Id. Rule 1.7(a), (b).
105. The reasonableness test is objective. "'Reasonable' or 'reasonably' when used in relation to conduct by a
lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer." Id. Terminology.
106. Id. Rules 1.6(a), 1.8(b).
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intense that it is reasonable to expect a lawyer consciously to ignore a client's goals,
or actually to work to impede them. This is a peril the Rules do not let clients run.
While Rule 1.7 states this position generally, Rules 1.5 and 1.8 give specific
examples of representations that will not be allowed because the risk of disloyalty is
too high. Prohibitions against contingent fees in divorce 10 7 and criminal cases 08 and
against acquiring "literary or media rights" in the subject of the representation10 9
anticipate that the lawyer may be tempted to urge a particular decision for personal
enrichment and not because the client's interests are thereby best served." 0 Other
examples in which the risk of disloyalty is held unacceptable, although there is not
necessarily a threat to the revelation of confidences, are the prohibition against
drawing "an instrument giving the lawyer . . . any substantial gift from a client""'
and the prohibition against acquiring a "proprietary interest" in the client's cause of
action."' Waiver is not allowed for these disqualifications.
Rule 1.8 stops short of banning other practices that pose threats to loyalty. For
example, business deals between lawyer and client present the hazard of concurrent
conflict and overreaching. The Rules allow these deals with several safeguards,
including that they be "fair and reasonable to the client" and that they be "transmit-
ted" to and accepted by the client "in writing."
'
"
13
The fourth client interest honored by the Rules is in autonomy-the power to
make decisions of consequence for one's life. The issue of client autonomy arises in
two ways. One focuses on the extent, if any, to which an ethics code ought to restrict
how a lawyer may legally serve a client in seeking to achieve the client's goals." 4
Opponents of restrictions argue that the fact that a person retains counsel ought not to
confine his or her freedom to choose means or ends permitted by law.115 Autonomy is
also of concern within the professional relationship itself. To what extent should an
ethics code permit an attorney to make decisions for a client, with or without con-
sultation?" 6 These two uses of autonomy should not be confused. Here we discuss
the second; the first arises in the section on the client-other dyad." 7
Most would agree that a client delegates to a lawyer the power to make certain
decisions that otherwise belong to the client, including many tactical decisions and
decisions to disclose information when that is "impliedly authorized in order to carry
107. Id. Rule 1.5(d)(1).
108. Id. Rule 1.5(d)(2).
109. Id. Rule 1.8(d).
110. For examples, see infra text accompanying notes 274-76. In criminal and matrimonial matters there are also
said to be "public policy" reasons for prohibiting contingent fees. See, e.g., Schoonover v. State, 218 Kan. 377, 543
P.2d 881 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 944 (1976) (criminal); Stepp, Groce, Pinales & Cosgrove v. Thompson, 70 N.C.
App. 174, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984) (matrimonial).
I11. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(c) (1983).
112. Id. Rule 1.80).
113. Id. Rule 1.8(a).
114. See generally Fried, The Lavyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the La yer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060, 1071-76 (1976).
115. Id. at 1073-75.
116. See generally Luban, supra note 55; Martyn, supra note 54; Spiegel, supra note 46.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 193-221.
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out the representation."' 18 This delegation may be seen to honor the lawyer's pro-
fessional independence. 119 All probably agree that a retainer alone does not imply
delegation of other decisions: whether and on what terms to settle a civil suit, and
whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, and testify in a criminal matter.120 Rule 1.2
says that "decisions concerning the objectives of representation" are for the client,
and directs the lawyer to "consult with the client about the means by which they are
to be pursued.' 121 Whether consultation on means is mandatory or only at the
client's request is not clear, 122 but in either event the client gets consultation only, not
control, with a few exceptions.' 2 3 The Comment to Rule 1.2 acknowledges that "[a]
clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn."' 24
Autonomy concerns also figure in duties to provide information a client may
need to make decisions in the client's domain. There is a duty to keep a client
"reasonably informed about the status of a matter"'125 and to "explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding
the representation;" 126 a duty to provide the client with information in the event of a
fee division,' 27 to put the terms of contingent fee agreements in writing,' 28 and to
communicate the "basis or rate of the fee ... preferably in writing;" 129 and a duty
of disclosure when lawyer and client enter a business transaction. 130 A number of
rules permit conduct only if a client or former client consents after "consultation," a
term that implies a duty in the lawyer to convey the information needed for judg-
ment. 13 1 The Rules also require that as far as reasonably possible, a client under
disability and without a guardian has the same autonomy as in a normal client-lawyer
relationship. 1
32
The interest in autonomy can be seen to subsume the client's interest in control-
ling information. Information that has not "become generally known" can be said to
"belong" to the client in the sense that an attribute of personhood is the power to
118. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
119. "A lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued." Id.
Rule 1.3 comment. Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3314 (1983) (criminal defendant's constitutional rights not
violated when appointed counsel exercised his professional judgment to refuse client's request to raise particular
nonfrivolous legal arguments in appellate brief).
120. On the client's authority in a criminal case, Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983); MODEL RUES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983). On the client's authority to accept or decline a settlement offer, see In re
Rosenthal, 90 N.J. 12, 446 A.2d 1198 (1982); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983)
("objectives of [the] representation" are for client to decide).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
122. Id. Rule 1.2 comment states: "A client... has a right to consult with the lawyer about the means to be used in
pursuing [the] objectives [of the representation.]" Id. Rule 1.4, requiring the lawyer to communicate with the client,
would seem to suggest that consultation may be mandated even if the client does not request it.
123. Id. Rule 1.2 comment reserves for the client authority "regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred
and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected."
124. Id. Rule 1.2 comment.
125. Id. Rule 1.4(a).
126. Id. Rule 1.4(b).
127. Id. Rule 1.5(e).
128. Id. Rule 1.5(c).
129. Id. Rule 1.5(b).
130. Id. Rule 1.8(a).
131. See, e.g., id. Rules 1.7(a)(2), (b)(2), 1.8(g) & 1.9(a).
132. Id. Rule 1.14(a).
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control dissemination of one's information, especially if it is "about" one's self. 133
Does the autonomy right also incorporate the loyalty and service interests? Disloyalty
may make it harder or impossible to achieve a goal, as may any number of external
events, but interference with a goal standing alone does not diminish autonomy.
"Autonomy" is not synonymous with "range of options." It is the freedom to
choose and to marshal one's resources in pursuit of a choice, not the right to pre-
vail.' 34 Does disloyalty impede automony? I think it does.
If I choose to buy a ticket for seat E3 at a production of Hamlet and a stranger
before me in line buys it first, my options, not my autonomy, would have been
limited. But if I had hired that person to buy me the ticket and she could then choose
not to do so or to buy it for another or herself, my freedom to marshal my resources-
specifically the resource of using an agent's services-would have been diminished
by the threat of such conduct, whether or not disloyalty occurs on any particular
occasion. If, in addition, my agent learned about the production of Hamlet or the
benefits of seat E3 as a result of what I had told her, using this information to my
disadvantage would be an infringement on my (autonomous) right to control the
terms of its disclosure.
In this hypothetical, my perception of the risk of disloyalty and misuse of
information might cause me to forego the option of using an agent to buy my ticket
and, instead, get it myself. My goal may still be realized. My autonomy is curtailed
to the minimal extent that I am unable to use a particular means to reach it. The
curtailment is greater, however, when the agent is a lawyer and the goal requires a
legal service. Since a client is often factually or legally powerless to perform such a
service, the risk of disloyalty by the only available agency poses an especially serious
threat to autonomy. 135 The Rules seek to counter that threat not only by forbidding
disloyalty in fact but also by prohibiting representation in circumstances that pose an
unacceptably high risk that it will occur. 136
B. Critique
Nearly all concessions to the client's interest in the client-lawyer dyad fall into
the following categories: they require that the lawyer do what the law obliges; or state
some duties in language so general that the hard questions are simply deferred; or are
concrete and focused only in describing other duties that are in the interest of lawyers
to have.
133. Cf. Fried, supra note 114, at 1068: "Before there is morality there must be the person. We must attain and
maintain in our morality a concept of personality such that it makes sense to posit choosing, valuing entities--free, moral
beings." Confidentiality rules may also be defended empirically: they encourage clients to be forthcoming and so enable
counsel to provide complete and accurate advice. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); MODEL RuTEs
OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.6 comment (1983).
134. Cf. Fried, supra note 114, at 1075; "There is no wrong if a venture fails for lack of talent or lack of money-no
one's rights have been violated. But rights are violated if, through ignorance or misinformation about the law, an
individual refrains from pursuing a wholly lawful purpose."
135. A client may be factually powerless because he or she is untrained and the matter is complex. Freedman,
La* yer-Client Confidences and the Constitution, 90 YALE L.J. 1486, 1494-95 (1981). Corporations and other legal
entities may be legally unable to represent themselves. See, e.g., Hillside Housing Corp. v. Eisenberger, 173 Misc. 75, 16
N.Y.S.2d 142 (1939).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 95-113.
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The service duties are a good example. Agency, tort, and contract law will
already have accounted for most of these, such as the duties of competence, to act
diligently, to keep the client informed, to respond to requests for information, and to
refrain from using confidences to the disadvantage of a past or present client.
137
These duties, furthermore, are presented in language so broad they say nothing
controvertible. They can embody most viewpoints, even conflicting ones. Invert
them. Would their opposites find advocates? Who argues that a lawyer acts ethically
if she fails to "provide. . .the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and prepara-
tion reasonably necessary for the representation' ?138 Or that an ethical lawyer can be
one who does not act with "reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client," 139 or fails to "keep a client reasonably informed . . .[or] promptly comply
with reasonable requests for information"?
140
The confidentiality rules, to the extent they impose duties on lawyers that sub-
stantive law does not, 14' benefit the profession. An oath of silence, enforced by threat
of discipline, makes lawyers more dependable servants. 142 Some individual lawyers
may feel uneasy at the denial of permission to breach a confidence even upon
discovering that a client has used their unwitting aid to work serious injustice on
another,' 4 3 but the Rules, like the Code,144 do not allow for conscience, possibly
because if any lawyer may reveal secrets, all may, and no lawyer could then be
trusted. Though the confidentiality duty does not yield in the face of injustice to
others,145 it dissolves if there is peril to the professional or financial interests of the
lawyer. 14
6
137. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
138. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 (1983).
139. id. Rule 1.3.
140. Id. Rule 1.4(a).
141. "The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences
and secrets of his client. This ethical precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source
of information or the fact that others share the knowledge." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSiBLrry EC 4-4
(1981); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.6 comment (1983). Much of the scope by which the
ethical duty exceeds the privilege will be subsumed by the law of agency. See supra note 46.
142. Compare United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 104 S. Ct. 1495, 1502-04 (1984) (unanimous Court declined
to recognize "a work-product immunity for an independent auditor's tax accrual workpapers" in response to an Internal
Revenue Service summons), with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (unanimous Court recognizes
attorney-client and work-product privileges in corporate counsel's interview notes with corporate employees). The
accounting profession is aware of the competitive consequences of the Arthur Young decision. See Lewin, Business and
the Law: Accountants v. Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1984 at D2, col. 1. See also The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98
H~asv. L. REv. 87, 306 (1984) (arguing that the law of privilege should be "recast ... in terms of function").
143. Gillers, supra note 14, at 676-77.
144. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBLITY DR 4-101 (1981).
145. Rule 1.6(b) allows a lawyer to reveal client information only "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary ... to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.6(b) (1983). Earlier drafts of the
confidentiality provision were more permissive and sometimes even insistent. Rule 1.7(b) of the 1980 draft, for example,
would have made disclosure mandatory if the client were set on "committing an act that would result in death or serious
bodily harm to another person." 1980 Draft, supra note 2, Rule-1.7(b). As late as the June 1982 draft a lawyer would have
been permitted to reveal client information "to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to result ... in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another,"
and also "to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's
services had been used." 1982 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b)(l). (2) (emphasis added). See also infra note 221.
146. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983), MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBLrry DR 4-101(C)(4) (1981).
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The client autonomy obligations similarly require that lawyers cede little. Duties
to provide a client with information repeat common law rules, 14 7 as do the grants of
client authority on settlement, guilty pleas, and whether to waive a jury or testify1 48 at
a criminal trial. The division in Rule 1.2(a) between objectives (for the client) and
means (largely for the lawyer after consultation) is hardly self-defining. The Com-
ment states the difficulty of "clear distinction"1 4 9 and, except at the edges,1 50 at-
tempts none. In litigation, where the knottiest problems often arise, the Comment
surrenders any position for ethics when it acknowledges that the "[lI]aw defining the
lawyer's scope of authority ... varies among jurisdictions." 151 Notably, the provi-
sion in the January 1980 discussion draft directing lawyers to "accept a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which
they are to be pursued" 152 was quickly scrapped. Another proposal, imposing on
lawyers a duty to keep a client "informed about a matter by periodically advising the
client of its status and progress," and to "explain the significant legal and practical
aspects of a matter and alternative courses of action to the extent reasonably
necessary" 153 survived as far as the June 1982 revised proposed final draft, 154 where
it was truncated into a rule that essentially requires only "reasonabl[e]" com-
munication. 15
5
Much of the loyalty duty also restates contract and agency law. 156 In one area it
is broader. This is in the use of prophylactic rules to forbid representations (some-
times subject to informed waiver by the client) that pose an unacceptable risk that the
lawyer will misuse confidences or be unable to pursue the client's objectives. Rules
1.7, 1.8, 1.9 and 1.10 enumerate most of these prohibitions. Since prophylactic rules
prevent a lawyer from accepting business she may want, we might expect them to be
used seldomly, and only when the risk of disloyalty is very great or when the lawyers
and clients whom the rule is likely to disappoint are small in number or short on
influence. This is what the Rules seem to do. Several of the non-waivable dis-
qualifications purport to protect, but also impede, less powerful clients-criminal
defendants, tort plaintiffs-while other potential conflicts commonly arising in
lawyer-client transactions are met with restrictions that are short of a total ban and
rarely more confining than legal rules standing alone.
A criminal defendant, for example, may be forced to accept appointed counsel
because he is denied the power to pay his preferred lawyer with the only "capital"
available-the right to his story. 157 A tort plaintiff may not relieve the financial
147. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
148. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983).
149. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2 comment (1983).
150. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
151. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 comment (1983).
152. 1980 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 1.3.
153. 1981 Draft, supra note 1, Rule 1.4.
154. 1982 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 1.4.
155. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4 (1983).
156. Singleton v. Foreman, 435 F.2d 962, 970 (5th Cir. 1970) (loyalty is an attribute of the attorney's fiduciary
duty).
157. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(d) (1983). Contra Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.3d
606, 639 P.2d 248, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1982).
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pressures of a defendant's dilatory tactics either by accepting financial assistance
from her lawyer or by selling him a proprietary interest in her claim. 158 By contrast,
the Rules accept the risk of conflicts that reside in business deals between lawyer and
client, 159 those that arise when a third person pays a lawyer to represent a client,' 6 '
and some of those that occur when a client's interests are at odds with those of
another client or the lawyer herself. 161 In these cases, the Rules permit the relation-
ship and rely on cautions or restrictions, mainly borrowed from law. For example, the
most significant limitation on client-lawyer business deals-that they be "fair and
reasonable to the client" 162 -- is one the courts separately impose. 163 The Rules add
little. ' 64
Consider, too, the issue of successive disqualification. To what extent should a
representation be disallowed not because it is inherently disloyal but because of the
risk that a lawyer will be tempted to use a former client's confidences against the
client? The alternative to disqualification is to allow the representation but to caution
the lawyer against misuse of confidences. The Rules employ both devices. A firm
may not represent a client against a person if a lawyer in the firm previously repre-
sented the person in a prior affiliation and the two matters are the same or sub-
stantially related. 165 The representation is not permitted because it meets the test of
double identity: there is identity between the first and second matters and there is
identity between the former client and the adversary of the current one. The test of
double identity provides a rough measure of the likely usefulness of the former
client's confidences. The greater the usefulness, the greater the risk of breach. If the
double identity test is met, the risk is considered high enough to require a prophylac-
tic rule.' 6
6
When either identity is absent, however, a caution is deemed sufficient to
protect the former client's confidences. A lawyer may represent a client on a matter
that is the same or substantially related to one the lawyer handled for a former client,
even though the lawyer may have useful information from the former matter, if the
158. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e), (j) (1983).
159. Id. Rule 1.8(a).
160. Id. Rule 1.8(0. See infra text accompanying note 285.
161. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 283-84.
162. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.8(a)(l) (1983).
163. Pollock v. Marshall, 391 Mass. 543, 462 N.E.2d 312 (1984).
164. The Rules require the client to consent "in writing." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.8(a)(3) (1983). They also require that the client have "a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel." Id. Rule 1.8(a)(2). But since there is no requirement that the lawyer advise the client to seek that advice, this
provision is apparently satisfied if some period of time elapses between proposition and consummation of the business
deal.
165. If the lawyer previously represented the client while a member of the firm, the firm and the lawyer are
disqualified from the second representation because of the firm's surviving loyalty to the former client, regardless of threat
to confidences. If the lawyer represented the client in a prior firm affiliation, the new firm has no surviving duty of loyalty,
though the lawyer does. Id. Rules 1.9(a), 1.10(a) & 1.10 comment. The new firm will then be disqualified only if the
lawyer has client information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b), which Rule 1.10(b) rebuttably presumes he does. See id.
Rules 1.6, 1.9(b) & 1.10(b). Here, I am concerned with disqualification from successive representations because of the
risk to client information. That issue is presented in the Rules independently of the duty of surviving loyalty only when a
firm lawyer previously represented the former client in a different affiliation. See id. Rule 1.10 comment.
166. Id. Rules 1.10(b), 1.10 comment.
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second representation is not adverse to the former client. 167 The caution against
disadvantageous use of the former client's information' 68 is relied on to meet that
risk. Conversely, a second representation may proceed against a former client on a
matter that is unrelated to the first representation although confidences from it may be
relevant to the later matter. 169 Again, the caution suffices. Of course, depending on
the facts, the temptation to use a former client's confidences may be very great in
either of the situations in which the test of double identity is not satisfied, greater
even than in some situations in which it is. Nevertheless, the ABA chose a formulaic
test for disqualification over one that would require assessment of the degree of risk
present in each case,' 70 and which would likely have led to more disqualifications.
This choice is consistent with other provisions of the Rules that prefer a caution to a
ban when it benefits lawyers to do so and accept a ban in lieu of a caution when it
does not. 17 1 To the extent the Rules require disqualification, they pick a test no
broader than the one most courts already use in deciding these motions in
litigation. 172 The Rules break no ground. This is not to say that the chosen test is
wrong. It has the advantages of greater predictability and of less interference with a
potential client's choice of counsel. 173 But in assessing the ethical domain defined by
the Rules it is important to remember that the bar adopted the standard that courts
now employ and might well have continued to use anyway. The bar's choice results
in minimal interference with a lawyer's availability to clients who might wish to
retain her.
We thus see in the span of the loyalty duty, as with the duties of service,
confidentiality and autonomy, that with few exceptions the Rules embrace the client's
interests when it is painless, even beneficial, for lawyers to do so. They are notably
less magnanimous when the price is the lawyer's to pay, as I discuss in the next
section.
THE INTERESTS OF LAWYERS IN THE CLIENT-LAWYER DYAD:
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
The previous discussion addressed duties of lawyers to clients by virtue of the
professional relationship. The Rules also speak to the interests of lawyers as pro-
fessionals and entrepreneurs, both within and outside the client-lawyer dyad. Here I
write about lawyers' interests within it. As we saw, duties springing from the client's
167. Id. Rule 1.9(a). Contra Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844, 851 (1st Cir. 1984) (on motion of plaintiffs, law
firm disqualified from representing defendant in civil rights case where it had previously counseled a different prospective
plaintiff in the case).
168. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNucr Rule 1.9(b) (1983).
169. Id. Rule 1.9(a) & comment; see also Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978).
170. For example, Rule 1.10(b) in the 1981 draft of the Rules, provided:
When lawyers terminate an association in a finn, none of them, nor any other lawyer with whom any of them
subsequently become associated, shall undertake or continue representation that involves a material risk of
revealing information relating to representation of a client in violation of Rule 1.6, or of making use of
information to the disadvantage of a former client in violation of Rule 1.9.
1981 Draft, supra note 1, Rule 1.10(b) (emphasis added).
171. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 249-85.
172. See, e.g., Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 1980).
173. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978).
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interests in service, autonomy and loyalty may circumscribe a lawyer's wish to accept
particular representations or wholly to control the pace and course of a matter. These
duties purport to protect the client from getting less than he paid for, in the form of
lack of service or antagonism to his interests, and from getting more than he wants, in
the form of the lawyer excluding him from participation in the representation. Else-
where the Rules emphasize the professional and financial interests of the lawyer,
sometimes to the great disadvantage of the client.
Noteworthy is the rule allowing a lawyer to withdraw from a representation if
"withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client." '17 4 It does not matter that the client objects to withdrawal. "Material
adverse effect" is not defined; the rule does not say whether it refers only to financial
and legal "interests." Even if there will be a "material adverse effect," withdrawal
is still allowed if "the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden
on the lawyer." 175 In other words, it is ethical for a lawyer to break a contract with a
client, though the client will suffer, if the lawyer reasonably concludes it was a bad
deal, or has become a bad deal because his or her practice has since improved. The
Code and Canons contained no such provision.1 76 A lawyer may also withdraw,
despite the adverse effect on a client's interests, if the client wishes to pursue an
"objective" which, though legal, "the lawyer considers repugnant or im-
prudent." 177 Another rule, drawn from the Code but broader, 17 8 permits a lawyer to
reveal client confidences in a fee dispute (of any size), or if the lawyer is charged with
wrongdoing. 179 A final rule responsive to professional independence gives lawyers
authority to "refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false," 8 0
even though a reasonable person could conclude the evidence is truthful and the client
wants the tribunal to consider it. In this group of provisions the Rules place the
lawyer's professional independence and financial advantage above all of the client's
interests: in confidentiality, in service, in loyalty, and in autonomy. The fact that the
lawyer may ethically withdraw despite an "adverse effect" on a client's interests if
she considers one of the client's objectives "imprudent"' 181 is an especially striking
compromise of client autonomy.
174. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1983).
175. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(5).
176. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1981); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 44
(1963).
177. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983).
178. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESONSIBLiTY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1981) (lawyer may reveal confidences or
secrets if "necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend himself or his employees or associates against an
accusation of wrongful conduct").
179. Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits revelation of client information to
establish a claim or defense ... in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983). For this exception to apply, the charge or claim against
the lawyer does not have to be made by the client, nor need there be an actual proceeding pending. Id. Rule 1.6 comment.
180. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(c) (1983). Cf. Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983)
(client's constitutional rights not violated when appointed counsel strategically chose not to raise nonfrivolous appellate
arguments requested by client).
181. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(3) (1983).
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An obligation that is not imposed may tell as much about the bar's view of its
ethics as one that is, especially when the former is consciously deleted. Rule 1.5
directs that "the basis or rate of the fee ... be communicated to the client, prefer-
ably in writing.... ,182 Three public drafts of the Rules mandated written fee
agreements with minor exception. 183 The last minute switch capitulated to the pro-
fession's interests at the expense of those of clients. Lawyers may now be con-
veniently vague about fees at the outset and avoid getting locked into a formula that
could turn out less remunerative than a different one. '84 In the event of a fee dispute,
a lawyer is in a much superior position to establish his claim. He can use client
confidences to do so.' 85 He has the resources to litigate at nominal cost. He need not
worry about disciplinary intervention.' 86 He may have the leverage of retaining and
charging liens. 1
87
By contrast, a written statement of the "basis or rate of the fee" protects the
client against a subsequent "misunderstanding," honest or otherwise. 188 It focuses
attention on the matter of fees and may lead to further questions, negotiation, or
comparison shopping. One is hard pressed to think how a client could possibly be
disserved by a written fee agreement. With a commendable absence of hypocrisy, the
Rules do not contend otherwise.
Weaker clients, those especially in need of a code's protection, are most harmed
by the absence of a writing requirement. Entity clients often have house counsel who
are as knowledgeable on the subject of fees as the lawyers they retain. Worldly and
educated clients will likely have experience with professional services or the confi-
dence and presence of mind to pursue detailed explanations. It is the unworldly, less
educated and inexperienced client who is most likely to suffer the consequences of a
later misunderstanding. In the calculus of this issue, the arguments are all on one side
and that side lost before the House of Delegates.
Further recognition of the lawyer's professional independence is not particularly
at the client's expense. In advising a client a lawyer "may refer . . . to . . .moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
situation." 8 9 This superfluous authority is so timidly suggested ("may refer") that
any tentative hint of the importance of these "factors" is dispelled, especially since
182, Id. Rule 1.5(b). There is an exception when the lawyer has "regularly represented the client."
183. 1982 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 1.5(b); 1981 Draft, supra note 1, Rule 1.5(b); 1980 Draft, supra note 2, Rule
1.6(b).
184. For example, a flat fee may be more or less favorable to a lawyer than an hourly rate, depending on how long it
takes to achieve a client's goal.
185. MODE. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983).
186. While it is unethical to charge an unreasonable fee, id. Rule 1.5(a), it is not unethical to have a fee dispute with
a client.
187. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 610.18 (West 1975) (recognizing both charging and retaining liens). A retaining
lien entitles a lawyer to retain papers and property of a client in the lawyer's possession until she has been paid or a court
orders the lawyer to release them. A charging lien gives an attorney a legally enforceable interest against the property she
may have helped the client obtain through judgment or settlement. See generally S. GILLERS, THE RIGHTS OF LAWYERS
AND CLIENTS 126-30 (1979).
188. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.5 comment (1983).
189. Id. Rule 2.1.
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the client can insist on technical legal advice only. '90 It is also said, again gratuitous-
ly, that a "lawyer's representation of a client ... does not constitute an endorsement
of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities," 19' and that a
"lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after
consultation." 
9 2
THE INTEREST OF OTHERS IN THE CLIENT-OTHER DYAD:
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 1
9 3
As long as a lawyer has not withdrawn, she must be prepared to pursue a client's
objectives by all available, permissible means, although the means are largely for her
to select. 194 This expectation of service and loyalty, discussed above, describes the
client's representational interests in the client-other dyad as recognized by the Rules.
The Rules also contain provisions that purport, in the interest of others, to
restrict what a lawyer may do for a client. Many of these duplicate law; some use
words like "unlawfully," thereby assuring that their prohibitions will not extend
beyond the legal mandate. For example, a lawyer may not "seek to influence a
judge ... by means prohibited by law" 195 or seek to "communicate ex parte with [a
juror] except as permitted by law."' 196 "In representing a client," it is said, "a
lawyer shall not use ... methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights
of [a third person]."' 97 And a lawyer may not "falsify evidence,"' 98 "offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law,"' 99 "unlawfully obstruct another
party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a docu-
ment. .... "200
There is also a crazy quilt of ethical obligations, most of which are not legally
mandated, that aims to protect others or the institutions of justice, at times to the
disadvantage of clients. A lawyer may have a duty or the authority to provide
information to another despite the effect on a client. For example, an entity lawyer
must "explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing." 20 '
This obligation serves the interest of the nonclient constituents (directors, officers,
stockholders) by cautioning against damaging revelations, but potentially hurts the
client by cutting off receipt of helpful information. A lawyer must also explain her
190. Id. Rule 2.1 comment.
191. Id. Rule 1.2(b).
192. Id. Rule 1.2(c).
193. A legal ethics code bears on the client-other relationship because the presence of a "client" presupposes
representation and thus also presupposes a lawyer whose behavior can be limited. The code cannot speak to the conduct of
the client or other directly. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
195. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5(a) (1983).
196. Id. Rule 3.5(b).
197. Id. Rule 4.4.
198. Id. Rule 3.4(b).
199. Id.
200. Id. Rule 3.4(a).
201. Id. Rule 1.13(d).
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role to an unsuspecting, unrepresented person with whom she is dealing on behalf of
a client.20 2 A lawyer must take remedial measures, possibly including revelation of
client information, if he has offered an adjudicative, administrative, or legislative
tribunal evidence he later learns is false.20 3 A lawyer must sometimes reveal legal
authority contrary to a client's position. 204 A lawyer must reveal even adverse rele-
vant facts in an exparte proceeding. 20 5 When a client retains a lawyer to undertake an
evaluation for use by a third person, the lawyer may have to reveal adverse client
information.20 6 A lawyer must sometimes report ethical violations of another
lawyer, 207 or disclose a material fact when failure to do so means the lawyer will have
aided a client's crime or fraud. 208 A lawyer is permitted to reveal confidential in-
formation when the client plans a "criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to
result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." 2 0 9
There are also obligations imposed in the interest of others that do not require the
revelation of information-some even call for silence-and which may likewise work
to a particular client's disadvantage. These include restrictions on speaking to the
press about adjudicative proceedings, 210 the advocate-witness rule,2 11 the prohibition
against making a material false statement of law or fact to a person or tribunal, 2 12 the
duty not to communicate with another lawyer's client or the client's agents, 21 3 the
duty not to ask potential witnesses to refrain from voluntarily offering to give
evidence, 214 the prohibition against assertion of frivolous claims or defenses, 215 and
the duty to refrain from using embarrassing, dilatory, or burdensome tactics in
representing a client.
216
What can we make of these provisions? Let us subtract those that cover the same
ground as law or court rule, such as the prohibitions against asserting frivolous claims
or defenses2 17 and against using dilatory tactics.21 8 Let us also eliminate duties to
which the client consents, such as the duty to reveal adverse information if the lawyer
is retained to give an evaluation to a third person. 219 We can also ignore directives
that dissolve in their own provisos. The duties to report another lawyer's misconduct
and to disclose a material fact if failure to do so is necessary to avoid assisting a
202. Id. Rule 4.3.
203. Id. Rules 3.3(a)(4), 3.9.
204. Id. Rule 3.3(a)(3).
205, Id. Rule 3.3(d).
206. Id. Rule 2.3.
207. Id. Rule 8.3(a).
208. Id. Rule 4.1(b).
209. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(l).
210. Id. Rule 3.6.
211. Id. Rule 3.7.
212. Id. Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a).
213. Id. Rule 4.2.
214. Id. Rule 3.4(0.
215. Id. Rule 3.1.
216. Id. Rule 4.4.
217. See, e.g., FED. R. cv. P. 11.
218. Id.
219. MoisE. Ruts OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 2.3(a)(2) (1983).
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client's crime or fraud disappear if compliance requires the revelation of client con-
fidences, as it virtually always will. 220
How can we describe the remainder? I suggest this way: they are duties imposed
in the interest of safeguarding the boundaries of adversary justice. The obligation to
reveal one's representational status, to avoid and possibly even correct material
falsity, to be complete in ex parte proceedings, the advocate-witness rule, the duty
not to take one's case to the media, not to communicate with another lawyer's client
and not to ask potential witnesses to refuse to volunteer testimony all protect the
dominant jurisprudential model for dispute resolution and interest reconciliation by
forbidding behavior that seeks to skirt its principles. These principles define a world
in which each party is protected by counsel and in which disputes will be concluded
and interests reconciled without knowing falsity and within the context of the formal
(court, agency) or informal (negotiation) institutions that the justice system provides
and lawyers dominate. "We place almost no ethical limits on what we may legally do
to win your objectives," lawyers are saying, "so long as you play on our court.' '221
THE INTEREST OF OTHERS IN THE LAWYER-OTHER DYAD:
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
When a lawyer is not acting for a client, the Rules impose even fewer duties on
him or her in the interests of others, including potential clients and the institutions of
the legal system. Most of these forbid rather than require conduct. There is no duty to
provide free or low-cost legal services for underrepresented interests,2 22 no duty to
work to improve legal institutions or the law,223 and no duty to contribute financially
toward either goal. 224 Lawyers are directed to accept court appointments, 225 but even
this direction is qualified if the representation will impose an "unreasonable financial
220. Id. Rules 4. 1 (b), 8.3(c). The lawyer need not report or disclose if he or she knows of the conduct as a result of
information protected by Rule 1.6. Since that rule protects all information "relating to the representation [of a clientl,
whatever its source," id. Rule 1.6 comment, it is difficult to conceive of a situation in which a lawyer will be compelled to
reveal client frauds or crimes and relatively few in which a lawyer will be required to report misconduct by another
attorney.
221. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(l), which permits lawyers to reveal information about a client "to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm," is an
exception to this description. But not by much. It is appreciably narrower than DR 4-101(C)(3), which it replaces and
which permits a lawyer to reveal a client's "intention ... to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBLTrr DR 4-104(C)(3) (1981). And it is substantially narrower than
equivalent provisions in public drafts of the Rules. See supra note 145. The death or "substantial" bodily harm
contemplated by Rule 1.6 as adopted must be imminent before the lawyer may reveal the information. The unexplained
use of the word "imminent," added on the floor of the House of Delegates at its February, 1983 meeting, Text of Revised
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Legal Times, Feb. 14, 1983, at 21, col. 2, suggests the influence of the products
liability defense bar. In short, this weak grant of authority is so circumscribed as to threaten almost no one while avoiding
the public relations crisis that would likely have ensued on its omission.
222. MOoEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 6.1 (1983), which states that a lawyer "should render public
interest legal service," according to the comment "is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process." 1980
Draft, supra note 2, Rule 8.1 provided: "A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service" (emphasis added).
223. MODEL RULES Or PROFESStONAL CONDucT Rule 6.1 (1983) includes "service in activities for improving the
law" as an example of the manner in which a lawyer may fulfill its nonmandatory directive.
224. Rule 6.1 includes "financial support for organizations that provide legal services to a person of limited means"
as an example of the manner in which a lawyer may fulfill its nonmandatory directive. Id.
225. Id. Rule 6.2.
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burden on the lawyer" 226 or if "the client or cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to
be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent
the client."- 227 Obviously, too, a lawyer may not accept an assignment she is in-
competent to handle. 228 For example, securities lawyers can properly decline
landlord-tenant and homicide cases.
The Rules restrict the ways in which a lawyer may advertise for or solicit
clients. 229 Much of the content of these provisions is dictated by the first
amendment.2 30 Other provisions, like the prohibition against "false or misleading
communication," may also be addressed by civil law. 23 1 Nevertheless, some of what
the Rules forbid lawyers to do in this area may be considered pure ethics: for
example, the prohibitions against telephone or in-person solicitation 232 and against
listing a "specialty."-
233
The Rules impose duties on supervisory and subordinate lawyers. 234 These can
be seen to further the interests of others generally, or the justice system, without
reference to a particular client or matter. But the obligations here are thinner than
might first appear. A supervisory lawyer is responsible for another lawyer's conduct
if he orders or ratifies it, or sometimes if he fails to mitigate or avoid it. 235 These rules
incorporate traditional principles of vicarious or accessorial responsibility. 236 On the
other hand, partners and supervisory lawyers are obliged to institute "measures" or
"make reasonable efforts to ensure" that colleagues and subordinates behave pro-
fessionally.237 These are preventative obligations, which the law might not otherwise
impose. 2
38
The rule on subordinate lawyers contains even less. It rejects a "following
orders" defense to a charge of unprofessional conduct. 239 The law would not likely
recognize one anyway. 240 It provides a complete defense, however, if the subordinate
acted "in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an argu-
able question of professional duty."241 If the resolution was indeed "reasonable,"
and the question "arguable," it is hard to imagine how even the supervisor would be
226. Id. Rule 6.2(b).
227. Id. Rule 6.2(c).
228. Id. Rule 1.1.
229. Id. Rules 7.1, 7.2 & 7.3.
230. See, e.g., In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
231. Cf. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (states may regulate legal advertising to prevent deception);
Guenard v. Burke, 387 Mass. 802, 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982) ("Unfair Trade Practices" statute applied in client's action
against lawyer).
232. MODEL Rue.Ls OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 7.3 (1983).
233. Id. Rule 7.4.
234. Id. Rules 5.1, 5.2.
235. Id. Rule 5.1(c).
236. See, e.g., In re Gladstone, 16 A.D.2d 512, 229 N.Y.S.2d 663 (lst Dept. 1962).
237. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 5.1(a), (b) (1983).
238. But cf. In re Fata, 22 A.D.2d 116, 254 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1st Dept. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 917 (1965)
(lawyer may be subject to discipline for failure to supervise violations of partners or associates when he should reasonably
have suspected their misconduct).
239. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 5.2(a) (1983).
240. See, e.g., In re Knight, 129 Vt. 428, 281 A.2d 46 (1971) ("following orders" defense rejected but sanction
mitigated where associate in a divorce case helped partner entrap a husband with a prostitute).
241. Mo1DEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2(b) (1983).
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culpable. The Rules are inclined to defer to a lawyer's reasonable resolution of hard
questions, 242 and simple ones are unlikely to admit of more than one solution.
Finally, I place in this category two prohibitions on representations by former
government lawyers. Without government consent a lawyer may not "represent a
private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally
and substantially as a public officer or employee.' 243 Furthermore, a lawyer who
formerly worked for the government may not represent a client against a person about
whom the lawyer gained "confidential government information" if the "matter" is
one "in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that
person. ' 244 The lawyer is absolutely disqualified. 245 The protected others here are
the government and the private party. The government cannot consent to the repre-
sentation and the subject of the information apparently cannot waive the disqualifica-
tion, although the subject could publicly disclose the information, and thereby re-
move the confidentiality.246 A firm with which a disqualified former government
lawyer is affiliated may represent the client so long as the lawyer is screened. 247
Why an ethics code should address these issues is unclear. The government,
unlike all other employers of lawyers, is capable of legislating to protect itself and
those who deal with or are investigated by it. It has been speculated that these
disqualification provisions protect lawyers who have not (or not recently) worked for
the government by neutralizing competition from those who have,248 but this ex-
planation is too harsh. When the rule was passed, a lawyer who voted for it could not
know whether she or a future partner or associate might later be in a position to wish
it had not been. I see the rule as a defensible attempt to protect others from a misuse
of information or experience in a way the law could but may not.
THE INTERESTS OF THE PROFESSION IN THE PROFESSION-LAWYER
(AND -CLIENT) DYAD: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
I have added the profession itself as a fourth player concealed in the text of the
Rules. By the profession I do not mean individual lawyers or even groups of lawyers,
but the enterprise as a whole, the professional equivalent of the body politic. One
may ask whether the profession has interests separate from those of the three other
constituencies. If it does, one may also ask what business it has advancing these
interests through rules of ethics. The bar, to be sure, would claim that a rule like 5.4,
242. The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason.
They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself.. . The
Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and
circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer
often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1983).
243. Id. Rule 1.11(a).
244. Id. Rule 1.11(b).
245. Id.
246. "Confidential government information" isdefined as information that "is not otherwise available to the
public." Id. Rule 1.11(e).
247. Id. Rule 1.11(a), (b).
248. Developments in Uie Law-Conflicts of Interest in tMe Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1244, 1432-33
(1981).
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which prohibits lay ownership or control of law firms, is in fact meant to protect
clients. I do not find that justification credible. Rule 5.4 must be counted as serving
the interests of some critical mass of lawyers, numerous and powerful enough to
force a change in late drafts of the Rules. The contention that in truth Rule 5.4
protects clients from lawyers who would otherwise invite lay investment or manage-
ment is at least as and possibly more speculative than the proposition that the rule
actually hurts clients. It also gives striking advantages to the profession generally,
while hurting some lawyers in particular. Finally, the risks it purports to avoid are
readily run in circumstances where it benefits the profession to do so.
Rule 5.4(a), (b) and (d) forbids a lawyer to "form a partnership with a non-
lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law,"
forbids a lawyer "to share legal fees with a nonlawyer," and says that
[a] lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or associa-
tion authorized to practice law for a profit, if ... a nonlawyer owns any interest there-
in ... ; a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or ... a nonlawyer has the
right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer. 249
In sole justification, the Comment states that these "limitations are to protect the
lawyer's professional independence of judgment. ' ' 250 The limitations have a good
pedigree. They are taken directly from the Code of Professional Responsibility 25 ' and
can be traced to the Canons of Professional Ethics.
252
Rejecting this history, the January 1980 discussion draft of the Rules expressly
allowed nonlawyers to hold financial interests and managerial authority in law
firms.253 So did both the May 1981 proposed final draft254 and the June 1982 revised
proposed final draft. 2 5 The last, like its predecessors, did impose limits. It con-
ditioned lay ownership and authority on, first, the absence of "interference with the
lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer
relationship;" 256 second, the protection of client confidences; 257 and third, firm
compliance with advertising and solicitation rules and with rules regulating legal
fees. 258 The ABA House of Delegates, deeming these conditions inadequate,
scrapped the proposed rule at its February 1983 meeting,259 and substituted the
Code's total prohibition on lay ownership or control of firms. 260 The prohibition is
249. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(d)(1), (2) & (3) (1983).
250. Id. Rule 5.4 comment.
251. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 3-102(A), DR 3-103(A) & DR 5-107(C) (1981).
252. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 33, 34 (1963).
253. 1980 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 7.5.
254. 1981 Draft, supra note 1, Rule 5.4.
255. 1982 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 5.4.
256. Id. Rule 5.4(a).
257. Id. Rule 5.4(b).
258. Id. Rule 5.4(c).
259. Text of Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Legal Times, Feb. 14, 1983, at 23, col. 3.
260. Id. Nonprofit entities are excluded from the ban in apparent recognition of the constitutional protection afforded
by such cases as United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971). Cf. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 414
(1978) (despite state interest in avoiding conflict of interest and otherevils, antisolicitation rules cannot constitutionally be
applied to a lawyer "who, seeking to further political and ideological goals through associational activity, including
litigation, advises a lay person of her legal rights and discloses... that free legal assistance is available from a nonprofit
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absolute. The purportedly protected client cannot waive it. It is inconsequential that a
firm has proposed procedures to prevent lay interference with the professional
relationship and to assure that no lay owner or manager behaves as lawyers may not.
The Rules, in short, keep the law business all in the family. They allow only
lawyers to buy and resell the services of lawyers, only lawyers to earn a profit from
investment in the law industry, and only lawyers to compete for high management
positions in for-profit law firms.
But some lawyers benefit and others lose, which is why the rule must be seen as
serving the interests of ABA control groups and not lawyers generally. A firm that
wants to accept lay investment and predicts it can without ignoring its duties to keep
confidences and exercise independent professional judgment may not do so, no
matter how persuasive a case it can make in support of its prediction. The result is to
exclude a major source of capital for new firms.261 Established firms, with accumu-
lated capital and clientele, are protected from the rapid growth of new competitors
that private investment might encourage.
Salaried lawyers, often younger ones, constitute another group who lose by
virtue of rules like 5.4. Because only other lawyers may hire them to provide legal
services to third persons for a profit, the number of these jobs will be limited by the
number of lawyers willing to create them. If the ban on lay participation were lifted,
the number of these jobs likely would expand. Legal time can be a remunerative
product bought wholesale and sold retail. Law firm partners know the benefits of
large associate-partner ratios. The associate's billing less her salary and overhead is
profit for the partnership. Lay investors might find the potential return equally attrac-
tive.
Finally, clients lose. Rule 5.4 suppresses competition on the supply side. The
fewer the consumer alternatives, the more lawyer-employers can charge for their
employees' time. In addition to the predicatable downward pressure on fees that
would accompany increased competition, lay investors might be willing to accept a
lower return on their money. The rule of thumb has been that a law firm associate's
time should be billed at a rate that nets a profit of one-third after deduction of salary
and overhead.2 62 That's a pretty good margin, one other investors might be willing to
undersell.
The American legal profession has had a sad history of adopting ethical rules
that have enriched its pocketbook but which it sought to justify as protecting clients.
This was true with rules against advertising, rules imposing minimum fee schedules,
organization" with which the lawyer is affiliated). Nevertheless, it is as easy as in the for-profit setting to conjecture a
clash between the goals of a nonprofit entity's clients and lay authority's perception of the entity's best interests. See. e.g.,
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 231-32 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
261. Hardest hit (and perhaps most threatening) may be legal clinics in need of capital to establish a strong retail
presence. For two efforts to hinder one of them, see In re Professional Ethics Advisory Comm. Opinion 475, 89 N.J. 74,
444 A.2d 1092, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 962 (1982); New York Criminal and Civil Courts Bar Ass'n v. Jacoby, 61
N.Y.2d 130, 460 N.E.2d 1325, 472 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1984). It is noteworthy that only lay equity investment is proscribed.
Loans are allowed. Yet a substantial lay creditor may be able to impose its will on a lawyer's practice as effectively as
could a lay shareholder and certainly more effectively than, say, an investor with a fraction of 1% of the shares of a
publicly traded national legal clinic. There is no explanation for this discrepancy.
262. See generally M. ALTMAN & R. WEIL, How TO MANAGE YOUR LAW OFFICE, chs. 4-5 (1984); Altman &
Weil, Inc., Survey of Law Office Economics, 25 LAW OMCE ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 326 (1984).
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and rules making it difficult or impossible to erect insurance schemes and engage in
collective efforts to secure legal services at reduced costs. The profession has had to
retreat each time, under pressure from the Supreme Court and the public.2 63 It now
says, in the conclusory words of the Rules, that Rule 5.4 is necessary to "protect the
lawyer's professional independence of judgment."-264 The Code and Canons were
hardly more forthcoming in defense. 265 I suggest that this explanation is transparent
and that few believe it.
Why should lay ownership or managerial authority pose the threat of in-
terference with a lawyer's professional judgment? Presumably because the lay owner
or manager's interest in the bottom line may conflict with a client's best interests.
Lawyers who employ lawyers also are interested in the bottom line, of course, but
unlike nonlawyers they are subject to the profession's ethical code. The remedy
envisioned in three drafts of the Rules-permitting lay ownership but making it
unethical for the lawyer employee to let lay authority interfere with the professional
relationship 26 6 -is rejected, apparently as inadequate.
This justification for Rule 5.4 makes two assumptions: first, that lay authority,
in pursuit of profit, will be tempted (and apparently more greatly tempted than
lawyers) to interfere with the professional relationships of their employees; and
second, that these efforts and the prospect that they will succeed are so likely that
only a prophylactic rule will suffice. Both assumptions ring hollow. With regard to
the first, I agree that the desire for profit often clashes with the duty to serve. But
what reason is there to believe that lay owners of law firms are less able than lawyers
to meet their commitments, as they routinely do in many other sensitive positions in
society? The Rules give none. The contention that lawyers are at least bound by an
ethical code that places service above profit is hard to take seriously when the same
code violates that very priority in permitting lawyers to withdraw despite "material
adverse effect on the interests of the client . . . [if the] representation will result in an
unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer." 2 67 The remaining sanction, a breach
of contract or other civil claim, is one to which lawyers and others are both subject.
The first assumption, I suggest, collapses into speculation and not a little duplicity.
So does the second-that a ban on lay ownership or control is the only way to
meet the risk first assumed, presumably because that risk is very great and because
lawyers will succumb to the anticipated intervention of lay persons upon whom they
are financially dependent. The credibility of this assumption can be tested by compar-
ing how the Rules treat other representations in which there is a danger to the
lawyer's professional independence, either through lay intrusion or because of the
lawyer's financial interests. In these situations, when do the Rules opt for pro-
phylaxis? When do they employ lesser measures? What does the pattern of choice
reveal? What can it tell us about the prohibitions in Rule 5.4?
263. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
264. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.15, 5.4 comment (1983).
265. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ECs 5-21 to 5-24 (1979); CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics
33 (1963).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 253-58.
267. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)(5) (1983).
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Rules 1.5 and 1.8 identify several representations in which the risk of conflict is
deemed sufficiently high to require that they be proscribed. Lawyers are forbidden to
draft instruments in which they or certain relatives receive substantial gifts, 268 to
accept contingent fees in domestic relations and criminal matters, 269 to make agree-
ments giving them literary or media rights prior to the conclusion of a
representation, 270 and to acquire a proprietary interest in a client's cause of action. 27 1
None of these exclusions can be waived. Whatever their merits, each differs from
Rule 5.4's exclusions in both cause and effect.
As for effect, Rules 1.5 and 1.8 forbid a lawyer to do certain things within a
retainer or to accept certain kinds of retainers. Only the particular lawyer-client
relationship is circumscribed. There will generally be ready alternatives to the forbid-
den representation or prohibited agreement.2 72 These rules, furthermore, entail no
special benefit to or burden on the bar. By contrast, Rule 5.4 speaks to the overall
machinery for buying and selling legal services. Its broad structural exclusions are
anticompetitive to the bar's advantage. 273 It is total, suffering no alternatives for
nonlawyers wishing to invest in or manage a legal enterprise.
A rule with such pervasive effects might be tolerable if the cause for its concern
were apparent or demonstrable, but it is not. Here too we benefit by comparison with
the conflicts described in Rules 1.5 and 1.8. A lawyer who represents a client in a
criminal or matrimonial matter and whose fee depends on an acquittal or divorce may
find it hard to counsel her client to accept a favorable plea bargain274 or agree to a
reconciliation. 275 We can see the direct and contrary pulls on the lawyer's judgment.
Similarly, a lawyer with media rights in a criminal defendant's story may have a
financial interest in a full trial with attendant publicity (and even in a guilty verdict),
whereas the client might better be advised to plead to a lesser offense. 276 Again we
anticipate that the lawyer may find it hard to recommend a result in the client's best
interests but disappointing to the lawyer. These conflicts are stark, clearly drawn,
almost palpable. The implicit predictions of Rule 5.4-that lay owners will find
interference irresistible and the employed lawyer will find resistance impossible, so
that only prohibition will suffice to protect the client's interests-are by comparison
268. Id. Rule 1.8(c).
269. Id. Rule 1.5(d).
270. Id. Rule 1.8(d).
271. Id. Rule 1.8(j).
272. For example, in domestic relations cases, the lawyer may seek a fee from the other spouse. Stepp, Groce,
Pinales & Cosgrove v. Thompson, 70 N.C. App. 174, 319 S.E.2d 315 (1984). In criminal matters, the client, if indigent,
will qualify for free counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Where a client wants to give her lawyer a gift,
the client will be able to use the services of a lawyer from a different firm.
273. See supra text accompanying notes 259-62.
274. See, e.g., United States exrel. Simon v. Murphy, 349 F. Supp. 818, 823-24 (E.D. Pa. 1972), Contingent fees
in criminal cases are also broadly said to be against "public policy." See, e.g., EC 2-20 (contingent fees in criminal cases
against public policy "largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not produce a res with which to pay
the fee"). See also supra note 110.
275. The prohibition on contingent fees in divorce cases is said to rest on the public policy favoring reconciliation.
"'Sound public policy demands that, when differences arise between parties to a marriage, no obstacle shall be placed in
the way of their reconciliation." Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 504, 75 N.W.2d 762, 768 (1956).
276. Maxwell v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.3d 606, 629, 639 P.2d 248, 262, 180 Cal. Rptr. 177, 191 (1982)
(Richardson, J., dissenting); Note, Maxwell v. Superior Court: Buying Counsel of Choice or Ineffective Assistance?, 71
CALtF. L. REv. 1348, 1351 (1983).
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attenuated, speculative, and problematic. While the circumstances addressed by
Rules 1.5 and 1.8 are discrete and limited, Rule 5.4 embodies a generalization that is
blanket and unrefined, and one that conveys an astonishing lack of confidence in the
scruples of its subjects.
Elsewhere the Rules are conveniently less cynical. They do not forbid lawyers to
work for lawyers because the wish to please may cause submission to unethical
demands. Instead, the Rules tell subordinates that following orders and personal
interest are not defenses to misconduct.2 77 Why an employed lawyer so cautioned
should find it more difficult to resist a lay authority than to resist a superior lawyer is
unexplained. Lawyers are also permitted to work for contingent fees, although these
retainers are laden with potential conflicts between a client's interests and her coun-
sel's finances. 278 And, as we have seen, lawyers may enter business deals with
clients though such transactions quintessentially pit personal profit against pro-
fessional duty.279
Three further provisions of the Rules, on which I especially want to dwell,
similarly anticipate a risk of intrusion on a lawyer's duty to a client but unlike Rule
5.4, eschew prophylaxis in favor of lesser measures. Rule 1.13 recognizes that the
client of a lawyer for an entity is the entity, not those who manage or control it.
280
How then do the Rules meet the risk that lay managers of the client may interfere with
the lawyer's duty to it? Since management's object of concern and the client are the
same-the entity-the parallel with Rule 5.4 where entity and client differ is not
exact. But it is also true, as Rule 1.13 envisions, that those in control of an entity may
act to betray it to their own advantage. 28' Stealing comes to mind as one possibility.
Using corporate opportunities for personal benefit is another. Or company officers
may choose not to recall a defective product or correct an erroneous prospectus
because revelation of the defect or error will subject them to civil or criminal liability
or to loss of their jobs. In any event, a lawyer for an entity may learn that manage-
ment is acting in a manner inconsistent with the entity's interests and in pursuit of its
own. Though the Rules contemplate this possibility, they do not forbid lawyers to
277. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.2(a) (1983).
278. Id. Rule 1.5(c). Consider a lawyer working on a one-third contingency where the client's chances of establish-
ing liability are excellent and where the probable maximum recovery is $300,000. The defendant offers to settle for
$210,000 after the lawyer has spent 100 hours on the matter, so acceptance of the settlement will net her an hourly rste of
$700. Preparation for trial will require an additional 200 hours of work but at most yield only another $30,000 in fee (or
$150 hourly for the extra time). The lawyer has other cases to which she would like to turn and which, if settled, will be
more remunerative than the time spent trying the current matter. The client asks the lawyer's advice on whether to accept
the settlement. Can she ethically respond? If so, does she have to reveal her interest? There are many variations on this
hypothetical.
279. See supra note 164 and text accompanying notes 159 & 163-64.
280. MODEL RUtEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 1.13(a) (1983). The House of Delegates attempted to avoid
even this reality at its February, 1983 meeting. Rule 1.13(a) of the 1982 Draft read: "A lawyer employed or retained to
represent an organization represents the organization as distinct from the directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents." See 1982 Draft, supra note 2, Rule 1.13(a). The House of Delegates changed this to
read: "A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization, including its directors, officers,
employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, as a group, except where the interests of any one or more of the
group may be adverse to the organization's interests." Text of Revised Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Legal
Times, Feb. 14, 1983, at 22, col. 1. The compromise finally adopted as Rule 1.13(a) states: "A lawyer employed or
retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituencies." MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 13(a) (1983).
281. MODEL RULES or PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.13(b), (c) (1983).
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work for corporations or other entities in order to avoid the risks that lay managers,
who are responsible for the lawyer's job and salary, may order her to ignore her duty
to the client and that the employed lawyer will be unable to say no. That certainly
would be an overreaction. But do the Rules then permit the lawyer to rescue the client
from the wrongs of its servants? Quite the contrary. The lay managers are assured that
the attorney will keep silent-must keep silent--even if it means certain harm to the
client.282 Where in Rule 1.13 is the great solicitude for clients that Rule 5.4 urges in
justifying a total ban on lay ownership or management of law firms? Rule 1.13 not
only accepts the risk of lay interference and professional submission, it protects the
wrongdoer when his deed is discovered.
Rules 1.7 and 1.8(f) also accept the risk of lay interference or personal conflict,
while cautioning the lawyer to resist both. Rule 1.7(a) says that a lawyer may
represent a client even if the representation "will be directly adverse to another
client," as long as the lawyer "reasonably believes the representation will not
adversely affect the relationship with the other client" and "each client consents after
consultation."- 283 Similarly, Rule 1.7(b) allows a lawyer to represent a client even
though the representation "may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities
to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests" as long as
"the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected,"
and "the client consents after consultation.' '284 Here we see a rule of reason that up
to a point trusts lawyers to avoid conflicts between clients on the one hand, and other
clients, third persons or themselves on the other, despite a risk that a particular
representation will "be adversely affected" or "materially limited," as long as the
client consents after consultation. Rule 5.4 envisions no opportunity for client con-
sent. The risk it meets is deemed too great for a similar rule of reason. As with Rule
1.13, the more generous scope of Rule 1.7 allows lawyers to keep cases and clients,
not lose them.
And so, finally, does Rule 1.8(f), which likewise tolerates a risk of lay in-
terference in a lawyer-client relationship, relying on lawyers to spurn any such effort.
Rule 1.8(f) allows a lawyer to be paid by one person to represent another as long as
the first person does not direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in
rendering legal services to the second.285 When the lay person is just paying the
lawyer's bill, thereby providing the retainer, and not selling the lawyer's time,
thereby competing with the profession, the danger of interference is met with a
caution.
282. The lawyer's only option is to withdraw. Id. Rule 1.13(c). Drafts of the Model Rules would have given the
lawyer the option to reveal organizational information to outside authorities in order to save it from illegal conduct of its
constituents "likely to result in substantial injury to the organization." 1981 Draft, supra note 1, Rule 1.13(c).
283. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1983).
284. Id. Rule 1.7(b).
285. See Rule 5.4(c), to the same effect; see also Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981), for a case whose facts
reveal how a client's interests may conflict with the interests of the person who pays the legal fee.
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THE GHOST OF CLARENCE DARROW
The Preamble to the Rules explains the public's interest in self-regulation:
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion
for government regulation is obviated. Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal pro-
fession's independence from government domination. An independent legal profession is
an important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal authority is
more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on govern-
ment for the right to practice.
The legal profession's relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of
self-government. The profession has a responsibility to assure that its regulations are
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested
concerns of the bar .... Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence
of the profession and the public interest which it serves. 286
The logic of these sentences is in several regards doubtful. We recoil from a
phrase like "government domination," of whomever it may be, because of the
historical baggage with which those words travel. But is the risk of government
domination of the legal profession appreciably reduced if the bar gets to write its own
ethics code? Courts, legislatures, and agencies are not thereby foreclosed from add-
ing another layer of control through legislation,287 administrative regulation,2 88 or
court rule. 289 It may be that a bar "not dependent on government for the right to
practice''290 will be more willing to challenge the government's "abuse of legal
authority, ' 29 ' but self-regulation does not carry that assurance. The state's monopoly
on "the right to practice" 2 92 is quite complete regardless of the identity of the ethics
code's author. Legislatures and courts decide who may be admitted to the bar,2 9 3 and
courts decide who will leave. 294 Limitations on their powers are found in federal and
286. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
287. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1982) (concerning disqualification of former officers and employees and partners
of current officers and employees of the Executive branch or independent agency of the Federal government); N.Y. JUD.
LAw § 90 (McKinney 1983) (admission to and removal from practice by appellate division).
288. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (Rule 2(e)) (appearance and practice before the Securities and Exchange
Commission); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979) (legality of Rule 2(e)).
289. See, e.g., Gair v. Peck, 6 N.Y.2d 97, 160 N.E.2d 43, 188 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1959), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 374 (1960) (upholding authority of intermediate appellate state court to adopt a court rule establishing
maximum contingent fees in personal injury actions). The fact that even the Model Rules have no force until adopted by
appropriate state governmental bodies further supports this point. States are free to change the Rules before adoption. New
Jersey, for example, acting through its supreme court, has done this. [Current Reports] I LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
(BNA) 382 (1984).
290. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct. 1989 (1984) (antitrust challenge to method of determining minimum
passing score on bar examination rejected on ground that conduct was state action exempt from antitrust regulation); Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (upholding New York's statutorily
required character inquiry); In re Beasley, 243 Ga. 134, 252 S.E.2d 615 (1979) (applicant denied bar admission because
he ignored state court orders to pay child support).
294. See, e.g.. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding Ohio disbarment order where
lawyer violated antisolicitation rules of state ethics code). See generally LAW. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (BNA)
§ 201:101-109 (1984) (inherent judicial authority to admit and discipline lawyers).
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state constitutions, not in the Rules. 29 5 Furthermore, threatening a lawyer's right to
practice is not the only-and would be a clumsy-way to discourage activism. A
hostile government has many weapons-search warrants, tax audits, indictments,
investigations, newsleaks and bureaucratic obstructionism come to mind-that can
damage a lawyer's practice while leaving his license intact.
But even assuming a straight line between self-regulation and protection of
liberty, there are other flaws in the Preamble's reasoning. Why, for example, should
the supposed connection mean that lawyers get to decide all issues in the Rules,
including whether fee agreements ought to be written, whether a lay person may
invest in a law firm, whether a lawyer must keep silent after discovering that a client
has used her unwitting aid to defraud another, and whether a lawyer should have a
duty to preserve relevant physical evidence for which process will likely, but has not
yet, issued?296 There is scant causal relationship between the profession's assumption
of power to resolve these and numerous other ethical issues and its willingness to
confront "abuse of legal authority." 297 Because some lawyers risk recrimination by
challenging this kind of abuse, it does not follow that the bar, most of whose
members do no such work, must be put in control of the many commonplace in-
cidents of practice.
Even if the logic of the Preamble were unimpeachable, its promise of a
"special . . . responsibility ' 298 goes unkept in the text it introduces. The rules there
set out are not "conceived in the public interests" and do further the "parochial [and]
self-interested concerns of the bar." The adoption of the Rules exemplify the dangers
of a kind of conflict they themselves would forbid in a professional relationship. Rule
1.7(b) would not allow a lawyer to accept a representation that contained an attorney-
client conflict as strong as the conflict between the profession and the "public
interest" that the profession has promised to recognize in exchange for the "relative
autonomy" to write its own code of ethics. It would rather anticipate that the public
interest would be "adversely affect[ed]" by the interests of the bar. Correctly, as it
has transpired, for the Rules impose few significant duties on lawyers, whether
running to clients, other persons or the system of justice, not already present in law;
require that lawyers yield little in favor of other interests; and define obligations and
create authority, beyond those recognized by law, mainly when it benefits lawyers to
have them.
There are principled justifications for some of this. Emphasis on duty to clients
despite harm to others has been defended on two theories: zealous advocacy of a
client's interests multiplied across all representations will yield the most justice of
which our democratic institutions are capable; and anything less deprives persons of
295. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (reversing state discipline where conduct found protected by the first
amendment); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (due process requirements at disciplinary hearings).
296. Compare 1981 Draft, supra note 1, Rule 3.4(a) (forbidding a lawyer to "alter, destroy or conceal a document
or other material that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is relevant to a pending proceeding or one that is
reasonably foreseeable") with Rule 3.4(a) as adopted (forbidding a lawyer to "unlanfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value") (emphasis added). MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1983).
297. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
298. Id.
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the full autonomy the law allows. These independent but compatible theories have
been the subjects of recent discussion. 299 Whatever their merits, they do not account
for and even contradict other choices in the Rules. They do not, for example, explain
the authority given lawyers to abandon clients when it is financially unreasonable for
the lawyer to continue, or when the client's objectives are viewed as "imprudent."
They do not explain the nearly total absence of duty to others when a lawyer is not
acting in a representative capacity. They do not explain the decision to eliminate the
requirement of a written fee agreement, or the decision to forbid lay investment in or
management of for-profit law firms. Indeed, the many lawyer-centered provisions of
the Rules that are not supported by and may even contravene these theories cast
doubts on attempts to explain the whole of the document by reference to them. Its
sole rationalizing principle seems to be that when the law allows a choice, competing
claims should be resolved in the way that most benefits the profession. Lawyers,
promising to protect the public interest, have instead used self-regulation to protect
themselves.
299. See, e.g., S. LANDSMAN, TttE ADVERSARY SYsmM 44-51 (1984); Fried, supra note 114.
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